very profession needs its gadflies: men and women who shake our complacency and force us to re-examine assumptions we have rarely if ever questioned before. Sometimes revisionists lead us, as the word itself suggests, to see things in a new way, and convince us that our former understanding of an event, a process, a person or a thing was fundamentally flawed. At other times the process of reappraisal leads us back to the same conclusions which we held when we began, but enables us to maintain with new confidence -now that they have been tried -that they are true.
torians. In fact, there is little evidence that the longbowmen, needing to fire with an extremely steep arc to cover the distance between themselves and the enemy and thus unable to penetrate their opponents' armor, did any more damage than the killing of a few horses and the wounding of even fewer men. While the archers did not kill many men, however, they did harass their enemy to such an extent that they broke into a disordered charge, a charge narrowed by continual flanking fire until it reached and stopped at the solid infantry line. 2 According to DeVries, historians (myself specifically included) who argue for the lethal efficacy of the longbow are committing the sin of technological determinism, and indeed 'have done military history and the history of technology a disservice':
Not only has this inhibited progress in understanding premodern military history in general, and premodern military technology in particular, but it has also too often and too easily removed the individual soldiers and their leaders from the military historical equation, replacing them with a technological, deterministic explanation. 3 Anyone who has read my article on Edward III's strategy 4 should realize how absurd it is to accuse me of removing the English leadership from the military historical equation, and in general I think DeVries seriously overstates the extent to which the historians he cites believe the longbow was an example of an '"invincible" technology', 'so much so that England was to gain many victories solely because of its use in warfare' 5 (emphasis added). DeVries does not give specific citations to the places where I or the other historians he names make such claims, and in fact I don't think that I or Jim Bradbury or Robert Hardy has ever written either that the longbow was 'invincible' or that it was the 'sole' cause of the English battlefield victories of the late middle ages.
So far as I know, no one has yet published a defence of the traditional view of the efficacy of medieval archery against DeVries's revisionist stance. In this short article I propose to do just that: to demonstrate that English arrow-fire in the battles of the fourteenth and fifteenth century did indeed do much more than 'the killing of a few horses and the wounding of even fewer men'. This is not to say that the longbow was an 'invincible' weapon, or even that its effectiveness lay solely in the deaths and wounds it inflicted, any more than the same is true of the bombs dropped by B-52s. All weapons are as important for their effects on those whom they do not hit as for their effects on the people they do hit. Battles are won more by the psychological effects of weapons than by their physical impacts: this is demonstrated simply by the fact that a defeated army very rarely suffers even 50 per cent of its number in killed or wounded, and indeed can rarely endure losses of over 25 per cent before acknowledging defeat. 6 But those psychological effects are the direct results of the physical ones, for it is primarily the sight of comrades being wounded and killed that demoralizes an attack and causes it to fail.
Even on a priori grounds, therefore, DeVries's argument does not make much sense to me. For arrow-fire to have had as significant an effect in disordering attackers as he acknowledges it did, it would have to have the power to do substantial harm: if the arrows could not do more than wound just a few men, then the attackers would simply ignore the archers' fire, and would also have no difficulty dispersing the bowmen and ending the disruption they were somehow causing. Certainly, if the longbowmen could not at the very least inflict large numbers of fairly serious wounds, then we would not hear of skirmishes and full battles being won primarily by their fire, which -despite DeVries's scepticism 8 -is often precisely what the contemporary sources say.
For example, the Chronicon de Lanercost says that at Dupplin Moor, 'the Scots were defeated primarily by the English archers'; 9 and Higden's Polychronicon says nearly the same thing.
10 At Kinghorn during the same campaign, 'the archers entirely alone vanquished the count of Fife' and his force, because the English men-at-arms had not yet 6 Even during the infamous charge of Pickett's and Pettigrew's divisions on the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg, for example, the attacking Confederates had only suffered about 25% casualties when their assault broke (another 25% of the original force was lost during the retreat down the slope). Note that this calculation supports Napoleon's famous dictum that 'in war, the moral is to the physical as three to one'. Cf. DeVries, 'Catapults', p. 464: 'Any deaths of men and horses which occurred would obviously have added to the disruption of the charge, but they need not have been numerous or to have occurred at all to gain the desired result.' disembarked from their ships. 11 The author of an anonymous bulletin from the siege of Tournai describes a major sally by the defenders which was 'defeated and cast back' by the English archers. 12 Froissart, Henry Knighton and the Chronographia Regum Francorum all agree with the Chronique du Pays-Bas that the French vanguard division at Poitiers 'was defeated by arrow-fire'. 13 There are also a number of statements in chronicles and campaign letters that the English archers 'put the enemy to flight' on various occasions; presumably they did so with their bows rather than with harsh language. not win battles; it is rather that they 'did not kill many'. 15 Now, if arrows did not often kill, then we must assume either that they were not even able to inflict many serious wounds (as DeVries suggests) or that they did often inflict serious wounds, but that these serious wounds were rarely lethal.
As I said earlier, I find it hard to understand how one can doubt that the English archers' clothyard shafts could and did inflict large numbers of serious wounds, for it is hard to see them having the disruptive and herding effect which even DeVries acknowledges unless they could do so. But we do not need to rely on such deductive reasoning to show that longbow arrows were capable of doing a great deal of damage of this type, since the chronicle sources are quite clear on this point. Let me start with the battles of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill. 16 At Dupplin, says the Pipewell Chronicle, the Scots 'were gravely wounded by the [English] archers'; 17 the Chronicon de Lanercost agrees that 'the English archers, by a continuous fire of arrows, so blinded and wounded in the face the first division of the Scots that they were helpless ', 18 and that the same thing happened at Halidon. 19 The Similarly, Froissart speaks of archers 'impaling' the Scots at Neville's Cross. 21 The chronicle of Tournai lists a whole series of named individuals 'shot in an arm', 'shot in a leg', 'shot through the chin', 'shot in the arm', 'shot in the thigh', 'shot in the eye', and so on, during the 15 siege of 1340. 22 The Chronicon Comitum Flandrensium says that at Crécy the archers of the Prince of Wales 'pierced through horses and men with their arrows', 23 and Froissart speaks of the archers' shafts 'piercing the arms and breasts' of the Genoese from longer range than the crossbowmen could shoot. 24 According to Geoffrey le Baker, the archers of the Captal de Buch's battalion at Poitiers 'greatly and horribly pierced' the miserable French. 25 Now, logically, if an arrow can inflict a serious wound, can 'impale' or 'pierce through' men, then it can also kill them. The difference between an arrow which blinds and one which kills, for example, is only a very small one. At Neville's Cross, King David had one arrowhead stuck in his face so that two surgeons had to be brought up from York to remove it, drawing it out through the nose; clearly the wound could have been lethal if its penetration had been just a little different. He also had another arrowhead which lodged in his skull, where it stayed until he died; again, this could easily have been a lethal wound. 26 Philip VI of France, similarly, fled from the field of Crécy with an arrow stuck in his jaw: he was just lucky that it had struck bone rather than an artery. 27 This point is reinforced by the very numerous descriptions of horses wounded or killed by archery -for example the two destriers which were shot dead from under King Philip in that same battle. 28 Any arrow which had the power to take down a medieval warhorse surely had the strength to kill a man as well.
'But wait', it might be objected, 'that doesn't follow. Horses could be killed relatively easily because they wore relatively little armour, and the wounds suffered by people like Philip and David were non-lethal not by chance, but because they wore armour protecting their vital points. So that explains why people could be wounded and have their horses killed, but yet not themselves be killed in large numbers by archery.' At first this objection seems reasonable, but in fact it cannot be used to salvage DeVries's assertions. First of all, even if it were true that arrows could not effectively penetrate plate armour, that would not impede the longbow from having acted as 'a killing machine' (to use DeVries's phrase) against lightly or non-armoured soldiers like the Scots at Halidon Hill, or even against a typical French man-at-arms of the early to middle fourteenth century. 29 King David and King Philip, after all, doubtless had the best armour available, yet that did not save either of them from suffering multiple serious wounds. Furthermore, we have positive statements that longbow arrows could and did penetrate armour. Adam Murimuth describes arrows (and lances) at Crécy 'seeking out the entrails of men just as much as those of horses, their armour rarely preventing it'.
30 Geoffrey le Baker, just as explicitly, says that at Poitiers the archers 'caused their arrows to prevail over the armour of the knights'. 31 Furthermore, turning again to the sources, we discover that there are a great number of straightforward statements that English archery did kill many individuals, whether light-armed Scots or well-equipped men-at-arms. 32 Thomas of Burton says that at Halidon Hill the bowmen 30 Murimuth, Continuatio Chronicarum, p. 247: 'lanceis et sagittis densissime intervenientibus, quae non minus hominum quam equorum viscera sunt scrutatae, armatura qualimcumque raro prohibente.' 31 Le Baker, Chronicon, p. 147: 'Nec officia sua sagittarii pretermiserunt, set, insistentes aggeri tuto supra et ultra sepem, coegerunt sagittas armis militaribus prevalere.' On armis, note that the standard Latin definition of this word, when it does not mean broadly 'implements of war', is indeed 'armour' not 'weapons', for which tela would normally be used. Thus armour, not just weapons, was needed to qualify soldiers as homines ad arma. In medieval English usage, however, armis often did mean weapons. Still, it makes more sense to read it here as 'armour', in context. 32 The examples in the text below are all of statements that the archers (unmixed with other groups) were the cause of death; there are in addition numerous statements that many soldiers were killed 'by flying arrows and by swords', or 'by arrows and bombards', etc. e.g. 'inflicted a tremendous massacre' on the Scots. 33 The French Brut d'Engleterre describes the archers as 'striking the Scots lethally with their arrows' 34 and 'striking them down by the thousands', while the Historia Roffensis says simply: 'the Scots fell, struck by the English archers'. 35 Murimuth says that at Auberoche the French had over 1000 light infantrymen and 700 men-at-arms 'killed by the archers'. 36 The Eulogium Historiarum speaks of 'a heap of over 1000 destriers and more, killed and wounded by arrows along with their riders' at Crécy, supporting the statement of the Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois that 'the English archers . . . by their fire killed many horses and men'. 37 The Chronographia Regum Francorum says that 'many of [the Genoese] fell to the arrows of the English', and also that the English 'attacked the French and killed more of them by arrows than in other ways'. 38 Jean de Hocsem says the archers 'killed a great number by their arrows'.
39
Gilles li Muisit says that the communal soldiers of Amiens encountered by Edward III's army on the day after Crécy 'were all either fled or captured, the English with their bows having surrounded and killed them'.
40 Matteo Villani describes the archers at the Poitiers 'wounding many men and horses with their arrows, and killing plenty of them'. 41 Froissart says that at Poitiers, at the approach of the first battle of the French, the English archers began to fire so thickly 'that no one either could, or dared to, put himself in their fire; so they wounded and killed in this fight very many men'. 42 There are other examples as well. 43 All the examples I have used so far, however, have been drawn from the fourteenth century, and DeVries's argument about the exaggerated claims of the efficacy of the longbow deals with the fifteenth century as well. Indeed, the first two sources he cites in his book as making the case 'against the decisiveness of the longbow', John Keegan's The Face of Battle and an article by Claude Gaier, both deal with periods 70-130 years after the battle of Poitiers, and it is well known that the murderous effectiveness of the longbow at Poitiers led to great changes in armour design intended in part to make men-at-arms less vulnerable to archery -a point, which, by the way, offers further evidence for the ability of arrows to penetrate the armour of 1356. 44 I am willing to concede Gaier's point that in the decades after the end of the Hundred Years War in 1453, armour improved (and archery declined) to the point that the English longbowmen were no longer capable of wreaking the kind of havoc I have described above. But I think there is plenty of evidence to show that, at the battle of Agincourt in 1415 and for some decades thereafter, English longbowmen remained fully capable of 'killing many' on the battlefield.
A few quotations from contemporary sources should suffice to make the point. Monstrelet observes that, at Agincourt in 1415, even before the general attack began, 'numbers of the French were slain and severely wounded by the English bowmen'. 45 Waurin, an eyewitness, is equally clear: 'the French began to hold down their heads, especially those who had no shields, because of the violent force of the English arrows, which fell so heavily that no one dared raise his visor [soy descouvrir] or look up . . . before they could come to close quarters, many of the French were disabled and wounded by the arrows.' 46 The same author says of the battle of Verneuil a few years later that the opposing English and Scottish archers 'began to shoot one against the other so murderously that it was a horror to look upon them, for they carried death to those whom they struck with full force'. 47 Perhaps the most dramatic statement comes from Lydgate's Battle of Agincourt: 'Our archers shot full heartily, and quickly made the Frenchmen bleed; their arrows went at great speed, and took down our enemies; through breastplate, haubergeon, and bascinet they went. Eleven thousand were slain there all in a row; you know right well that it was so.' 48 A better description of the effects of a 'killing machine' we could hardly ask for. 
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